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We tend to sympathize with addicts who behave illegally or immorally 
in service of their addictive cravings more readily than we do with 
those who act in exactly the same ways but who are not addicted. The 
addict who kills for money to buy crack seems less a moral monster 
than the unaddicted person who coldly plots the same murder for the 
same purpose. This distinction in our moral sentiments sometimes 
manifests itself in a distinction in legal and moral treatment: addicts 
are rarely thought blameless, but they are often taken to be less at fault 
than their unaddicted counterparts. But is the fact that a person’s ob- 
jectionable conduct springs from an addiction of genuine moral or 
legal weight? And, if it is, what is it about addiction that produces 
some form of diminished responsibility? In the last few years, a star- 
tling amount of literature relevant to these topics has appeared, pro- 
duced by theorists in a wide variety of disciplines from jurisprudence, 
psychology and ethics to economics, political science and neurobiol- 
ogy. This essay critically examines some of the most prominent recent 
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efforts to explain the impact, if any, of addiction on freedom and ratio- 
nality, and, in turn, legal and moral responsibi1ity.l 
There is something like consensus in the literature, and with good 
reason, that if addiction does diminish responsibility it is not for the 
reason that, say, epilepsy diminishes responsibility. The epileptic 
might do damage when in the fit of a seizure, but she is not responsi- 
ble for that damage since her spasmodic movements are not moti- 
vated. She differs from a person who is thrown to the ground by the 
wind only in that the “wind” that blows her about springs from a con- 
dition within her own brain. But behavior stemming from addiction is 
not like this. The addict is motivated to get that to which she is ad- 
dicted. As Gary Watson puts the point, “One who is defeated by appe- 
tite is more like a collaborationist than an unsuccessful freedom 
fighter.”2 The first question is how, if at all, the motivational structures 
involved in addiction differ from those of the unaddicted; the second 
question is what difference, if any, this makes to responsibility for be- 
havior stemming from addiction. While the bulk of the recent work on 
addiction is concerned with the first of these questions, the second 
will be considered here as well. 
There is both a legitimate moral and legal basis for distinguishing 
among (1) those who wholeheartedly and unreservedly pursue illegal 
or immoral courses of action, (2) those who do wrong out of compul- 
sion, that is, unfreely, and (3) those who do wrong as a result of transi- 
tory powerful impulses and thus manifest irrational weakness-crimes 
of passion, for instance. One approach to understanding the impact of 
addiction on responsibility places addicts in category (2). To adopt this 
approach is to say that addicts are subject to irresistible desires or are 
in some other way compelled to act as they d0.3 This is to contrast 
1. Recent discussions of policy issues about addiction are not discussed here, al- 
though there is very interesting work on the topic to be found. Cf. Helge Wad, “To 
Legalize or Not to Legalize: Is That the Question?” in GH, pp. 137-72; Douglas N. Husak, 
Drugs and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Husak, “Addiction and 
Criminal Liability” in LP 18 (1999): 655-84. 
2. Gary Watson, “Disordered Appetites” in ME, p. 7. 
3. One ndive way to make good on the thought that addiction undermines freedom 
would be to argue for the claim that addicts are compelled to do what they do in some- 
thing like the way in which a man falling from a bridge is compelled to hit the water. 
That is, we might think that addiction takes control of our bodies independently of our 
wills rather than inducing irresistible desires. In the popular imagination, this concep- 
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behavior stemming from addiction with behavior reflective of an 
agent’s capacity to control what she does. We can imagine a variety of 
ways of pursuing this strategy differing with respect to their analyses of 
the freedom necessary for moral responsibility, on the one hand, and 
addictive behavior, on the other.4 But whatever the details of such ac- 
counts, adopting this approach amounts to claiming that addiction is a 
familiar excusing condition analogous to other conditions, such as in- 
sanity, that excuse from responsibility by removing the agent’s capacity 
to engage in legally or morally responsible behavior. Those who take 
insanity to undermine freedom often argue that insanity removes its 
victim’s capacity to act rationally, and further claim that such a capac- 
ity is required for the freedom necessary for moral or legal respon- 
sibility. We might adopt a similar position with respect to addiction. 
Still, to take this approach is to say that addiction undermines respon- 
sibility by eliminating freedom. 
An alternative to the view that addiction eliminates freedom takes 
addiction to influence the agent either not to employ, or to misemploy, 
her capacities for rational conduct. This approach contrasts addictive 
tion of the addict’s behavior is encouraged by recent discoveries in neurobiology map- 
ping the neurological effects of drug consumption. (For a useful survey of recent re- 
search of this sort see Eliot Gardner and James David, “The Neurobiology of Chemical 
Addiction” in GH, pp. 93-136.) But it is only when mind-body relations are understood 
very ndively that such results are taken to indicate any such thing. After all, even deliber- 
ate action typical of free agency must have some kind of neurological basis. Besides, it 
runs directly contrary to the phenomenology of addiction to suggest that the cravings 
felt by addicts play no role in generating their behavior. For closely related remarks, and 
helpful discussion of the limitations of the disease model of addiction, see Stephen J. 
Morse, “Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility,” LP ig (2000): 3-49. 
4. One of the best known ways of accounting for the diminished responsibility of 
addicts appears in Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” 
in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University mess, 
igBB), pp. 11-25. Frankfurt’s explanation depends on both a controversial conception of 
freedom and a controversial conception of addiction. Freedom of the sort that addiction 
undermines, according to Frankfurt, is enjoyed by an agent just in case the motivational 
efficacy of her first order desire depends upon her wanting that first order desire to be 
efficacious. Frankfurt takes the addicted agent to be such that her first order desire for 
that to which she is addicted wiU be effective regardless of whether or not she wants it 
to be. There is a substantial literature assessing both of these aspects of Frankfurfs 
position, the examination of which would take us too far afield. For helpful discussion 
and an overview, see Gary Watson, “Free Action and Free Will” in Mind 96 (1987): 145-72 
(esp. pp. 147-53). See also Olav Gjelsvik, “Freedom of the Will and Addiction” in AEE, pp. 
29-54. 
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behavior with the peculiarly repugnant behavior of a person who acts 
objectionably but whose conduct is the product of correctly function- 
ing rational processes.5 Perhaps, that is, addictive behavior is as much 
under control as the behavior of the unaddicted, but the conduct of 
the addicted agent does not spring from the exercise, in service of 
something objectionable, of rational capacities, in the way that the 
most morally objectionable conduct does. To adopt this approach is 
to see addiction as irrational behavior-weak-willed behavior-per- 
formed by agents in possession of the capacity to act as they ought.6 
Action expressive of weakness, it seems, is diminished in respon- 
sibility, rather than excused entirely from responsibility, and so this 
approach, in placing the addict in category (31, provides grounds, for 
instance, for lesser sentences for addicts, or for lesser moral censure 
than would be appropriately applied to an unaddicted agent who acts 
similarly. 
According to a third, deflationary, approach, there is little reason to 
think that addiction diminishes responsibility at all; addicts, that is, fall 
under category (1). I begin, in Section I, with consideration of the 
grounds for advocating such a position provided by rational choice 
theory of the sort practiced by most economists.7 Under views of this 
5. A certain sort of ethical rationalist will deny that there is any immoral behavior 
that is fuUy rational. But even ethical rationalists of this sort think that immoral behavior 
could be the product of processes that are “rational” in some sense of the term. Such 
rationalists, for instance, can distinguish between instrumentally or procedurally ratio- 
nal and irrational immoral conduct. So, the approach under discussion for accounting 
for the responsibility-undermining force of addiction is open to ethical rationalists. 
6. Self-deception may play an important role in many addictions. The alcoholic may 
drink, for instance, believing that he must since it would be rude not to toast his host 
when, in fact, the host couldn’t care less and he is really drinking to satisfy his craving. 
This essay doesn’t discuss issues of cognitive irrationality but focuses, instead, on the 
way in which one can choose, or be motivated to choose, irrationally even while having 
rational beliefs. For an important recent discussion of self-deception see Alfred Mele, 
Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
7. Another way of pursuing this deflationary approach starts with the thought that 
addicts are usually responsible for the fact that they are addicted, and so the fact that 
addictive behavior is irrational does not ameliorate the addict’s responsibility. Such 
views encounter a variety of obstacles; perhaps the most important is this: People are 
very often excused from responsibility for behavior springing from conditions acquired 
voluntarily The responsibility of a parent who takes objectionable steps to prevent sep- 
aration from a child is diminished. But a parent’s attachment to a child is no less volun- 
tarily acquired than many addictions. For further discussion, see Section 111. 
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sort, addiction influences action in something like the way in which 
poverty influences action. For those unlucky enough to be in poverty, 
it can be rational to commit crimes. But we don’t ordinarily think that 
the poverty-stricken are thereby excused from responsibility, even if 
we feel empathy for their predicament. Perhaps an agent can find her- 
self in circumstances such that, because she is rational, she ends up 
engaging regularly in destructively high levels of drug consumption. 
Section I focuses on the work of economist Gary Becker who argues 
that addictive behavior is a result of rational efforts to satisfy prefer- 
ences for certain special goods given temporal constraints. It is argued 
that while illuminating in certain respects, such views are able to ac- 
complish their aim of characterizing the addict as fully rational, and 
thus fully responsible, only by maintaining an implausibly thin con- 
ception of that which can be rationally assessed. Thus, rational choice 
models of addictive behavior tell us something important about addic- 
tion, but they don’t tell us as much about the responsibility of addicts 
as we we would like. 
The failures of a pure rational choice view of addiction encourage 
approaches that exploit some of the tools of rational choice theory 
but, at the same time, deny that addicts are rational in the sense 
meant by rational choice theorists. Section I1 looks at the view of 
George Ainslie. Like Becker, Ainslie thinks that addiction is the out- 
come of rational efforts to satisfy preferences in the face of temporal 
constraints. However, Ainslie thinks that the way in which addicts re- 
spond to such constraints is irrational and indicative of weakness of 
will. Thus, Ainslie places addicts in category (3). Section I1 argues that 
Ainslie’s account, as developed in his most recent work, coherently 
identifies a form of irrationality to which addicts are subject only by 
failing to make room for an adequate account of the relationship be- 
tween the will and our capacities for rationality. What this implies, as 
we’ll see, is that while Ainslie is right that a fully satisfactory account of 
addictive behavior must depart from the rational choice theorist’s con- 
ception of the agent, the needed departure might be more radical than 
Ainslie envisions. 
Section I11 examines the views of George Loewenstein, Jon Elster 
and Gary Watson, all of whom depart from the standard rational 
choice model’s picture of the addict differently from the way Ainslie 
departs from it. Loewenstein, Elster and Watson question the rational 
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choice theorists’s assumption that there can be no break at any partic- 
ular time between what the agent judges to be best and what she is 
most motivated to pursue. All three of these theorists analyze addic- 
tion as a condition of susceptibility to certain special “visceral,” or as 
Watson puts it, “appetitive” motives for action. There remains prob- 
lematic ambiguity about the implications for responsibility of such 
views. It is unclear, that is, whether such views imply that addicts be- 
long in category (2) or in category (3). Section I11 examines recent ef- 
forts to remove this ambiguity. While progress has been made on this 
front, there remains a great deal of work to do. 
I. ADDICTION AND TRADITIONAL RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
According to the influential economic model of addiction proposed by 
Becker, addicts rationally act so as to maximize their preferences at 
each and every moment.8 However, they differ from the unaddicted by 
virtue of the fact that (1) they engage in regular heavy consumption of 
a particular substance, where the unaddicted do not consume the sub- 
stance at all, or only at much lower levels, and (2) the overall welfare of 
the low level consumers (the unaddicted) is significantly higher than 
the overall welfare of the high level consumers (the addicted). How 
could a rational agent end up in such a predicament? Becker demon- 
strates that this occurs when a substance that is pleasant to use in- 
duces tolerance and reinforces its own consumption, and the agent 
weighs the goods of the present much more heavily than those of the 
future.9 
8. Becker’s overall approach is expressed in his The Economic Approach to Human 
Behavior (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976). The approach is applied to addiction 
in Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy, “A Theory of Rational Addiction,” Jounal of Political 
Economy 96 (1998): 675-700. Also relevant is Gary Becker, Michael Grossman and Kevin 
Murphy, “Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption” in Choice Over 
T h e  (henceforth 0, George hewenstein and Jon Elster eds. (New York Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1992). 
9. Becker’s derivation of this implication is summarized very nicely in Ole-Jargen 
Skog, “Rationality, Irrationality and Addiction-Reflections on Becker and Murphy‘s 
Theory of Addiction” in GH, pp. 173-207. Skog’s simplified presentation of Becker’s posi- 
tion is an important contribution to the philosophical literature on addiction and ratio- 
nality, since Becker’s own presentation of his view relies on mathematical reasoning that 
few philosophers are able to follow. The presentation of Becker’s position offered in the 
main text differs from Skog’s only in style. 
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Becker analyzes tolerance and reinforcement as follows: 
Tolerance: A substance induces tolerance if and only if the more the 
agent has consumed in the past the less utility she receives from a 
given level of present consumption. 
Reinforcement: A substance reinforces its own consumption if and 
only if the more the agent has consumed in the past the more utility 
she will receive from an increase in consumption. 
So, for instance, crack cocaine induces tolerance since the more hits 
one has taken, the more one needs to take to receive the same high. It 
also reinforces its own consumption, since by increasing consump- 
tion-say, by taking two hits today after taking only one yesterday- 
one increases one’s pleasure and avoids the pain of withdrawal. The 
second hit makes more of a difference to the agent than it would have 
had she not consumed in the past since past consumption places the 
agent in a position of suffering withdrawal should she consume at the 
same or a lower level. 
Notice that it is quite possible for a regular consumer of a substance 
that induces tolerance (putting aside, for a moment, reinforcement of 
consumption) to have a lower level of overall welfare than an agent 
who abstains entirely. Imagine, for instance, that the welfare level of an 
agent over the course of a day can be measured on a scale from - 10 to 
10, with 10 being the best. And consider the ten day career of two 
agents one of whom uses and one of whom abstains from use of a 
substance that induces tolerance. Let’s say that the Abstainer enjoys a 
level 6 day each day, and so has an overall welfare of 6 X 10 = 60 over 
the ten days. The User’s overall welfare is more complicated to calcu- 
late. Since the substance is pleasurable to use, we can imagine that 
someone who has never used before can increase his welfare by + 4 by 
using; so someone who has never used is choosing, the first time, be- 
tween having a level 6 day in which he abstains and a level 10 day in 
which he uses. Since the substance induces tolerance, let’s say that 
someone can increase his welfare by one point less through use for 
each day in the past in which he has used. If he has used only once in 
the past, he gets a boost of +3 through use; if twice, then a boost of 
+ 2  and so on. So, we have the following equation which I will call 
“The Welfare Through Use Equation”: 
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[The total welfare enjoyed by someone who uses on a particular 
day] = [default welfare level] + [boost from use corrected for toler- 
ance level] 
In this equation, the “default welfare level” is the amount of welfare 
that someone who never used would experience on that day. So, on 
the first day, the User has a level 10 day (6 + 4). On the second day he 
has a level g day (6 + 3), on the third a level 8 day (6 + 2), and so on. 
After the fourth day, then, his welfare is reduced through use rather 
than increased, but if he continues to use, nonetheless, his overall wel- 
fare over the ten day period will be the sum of the integers from 10 to 
1. This yields a total ten-day welfare level of 55: 5 points less than the 
person who abstained over the same ten-day period. 
If the substance merely induced tolerance no rational agent would 
continue to use over a ten day period even if she made her decision 
about what to do on a given day without any regard for her welfare on 
future days. On the fifth day, the agent’s tolerance is such that using 
isn’t worth the cost. But, if we add in consideration of the fact that the 
substance also reinforces its own consumption, then on any given day 
someone who has used in the past might do better on that day by 
using. If the substance reinforces its own consumption, then were the 
agent not to use on a particular day, her expected welfare for that day 
would be reduced proportionally to the amount that she had used in 
the past. So, if we say, for instance, that her expected welfare were she 
to abstain is equal to the welfare of the person who never abstains 
minus the number of days she has used we derive the following equa- 
tion, which I wil call “The Welfare Through Abstention Equation”: 
[The total welfare enjoyed by someone who abstains on a particular 
day] = [default welfare level] - [degree to which use is reinforced] 
For someone choosing between use and abstention, use promises the 
degree of welfare specified by the Welfare Through Use Equation, and 
abstention promises the degree of welfare specified by the Welfare 
Through Abstention Equation. So, consider the position of someone 
who has never used before, and who chooses to use on each of ten 
days. Here the first number of the ordered pair is the level of welfare 
she can expect should she use and the second is the level of welfare 
she can expect should she abstain: 
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Day5 Day6 Day7 Day8 Day9 Day io 
(6, 2) (5, 1) (4, 0) (3, -1) (2, - 2 )  (1, -3) 
Since the first number of each ordered pair is higher than the second, 
an agent who chooses what to do on a given day only by considering 
her expected welfare on that day will use every day of the ten and will 
end up with a net overall welfare score lower than that of the person 
who abstains on all ten days. 
How is a rational agent to avoid this unattractive result? Clearly, it is 
important to consider more than just one’s welfare on a particular day 
in deciding what to do. Rational agents also take the future into con- 
sideration. So, in our example, a rational agent who weighs the future 
with exactly the same strength as the present will abstain on each of 
the ten days, for she will see that through using she enjoys only a 
temporary increase in welfare and pays the price later.l0 
Becker has demonstrated that whether or not a rational agent is an 
addict in his sense-that is, whether or not one finds oneself in a 
lifestyle of high usage of a substance that induces tolerance and rein- 
forces its own consumption and where a high usage lifestyle promises 
a lower level of welfare than a low usage lifestyle-depends upon the 
degree to which the agent discounts the future. We have seen how this 
happens in the extreme cases-a rational agent who weighs only the 
present in her deliberations ends up an addict and a rational agent 
who weighs the future no more weakly than the present does not. 
Becker has shown, however, that someone who does discount the fu- 
ture, but does so only weakly (weighing tomorrow’s hang-over at, say, a 
welfare level of 2.1 when, in fact, it will be experienced at a level 2) will 
not fall into a cycle of heavy use, while someone who takes the future 
into account but discounts it very heavily (allowing tomorrow’s level 2 
hang-over to weigh into his present deliberations as, say, 3.4) will end 
up in a cycle of heavy usage despite the fact that both agents, at every 
step of the way, rationally do what they most prefer at the time. 
10. Things will be more complicated if tolerance or reinforcement have a tendency to 
subside. Depending on how quickly one can bounce back to default welfare levels in the 
absence of use, it might be rational to use for a few days and then stop, thereby reaping 
the benefits of use without eroding the expected utility of abstention to the point at 
which the use itself was not worthwhile. 
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Can the degree to which an agent discounts the future be rationally 
assessed? If so, then Becker could be taken to have shown (although 
he would not endorse this characterization of his view) that some 
forms of discounting of the future are rational-those that lead the 
agent to adopt a lifestyle of low consumption of tolerance-inducing, 
reinforcing substances-and others are not. The result would be that 
even under his model of addiction there might be a distinction in ra- 
tionality between addicts and nonaddicts. Elster, who endorses an in- 
strumental conception of rationality, holds that such a conception 
commits one to the claim that there are no standards of rationality by 
which tendencies to discount the future can be rightly assessed. He 
writes, 
A time preference is just another preference. Some like chocolate 
ice cream, whereas others have a taste for vanilla: this is just a brute 
fact, and it would be absurd to say that one preference is more 
rational than another. Similarly, it is just a brute fact that some like 
the present, whereas others have a taste for the future. . . . If some 
individuals have the bad luck to be born with genes, or be exposed 
to external influences, that make them discount the future heavily, 
behavior with long-term destructive consequences may, for them, 
be their best option. We cannot expect them to take steps to reduce 
their rate of time discounting, because to want to be motivated by 
long-term concerns ips0 facto is to be motivated by long-term 
concerns.” 
u. Elster, SF, p. 146. As discussed in Section 111, in connection with Elster’s own posi- 
tive view of addiction, the opinion Elster offers is consistent with the view, which he also 
holds, that a tendency to discount the future can be irrational by virtue of its causes. But 
Elster does hold that a tendency to steeply discount the future is not irrational merely by 
virtue of its steepness. 
The last sentence of the quotation seems to be offering the following, unsound argu- 
ment: “(Pi) Someone’s preference for the present is irrational only if that person could 
be motivated to correct it. (P2) Someone who is motivated to have a preference for the 
future over the present already has that preference. (Conclusion) A preference for the 
present is never irrational; one could never both have such a preference and be moti- 
vated to correct it.” The argument is unsound since P2 is certainly false, and PI may be 
false. Pa is false, since one can be motivated to acquire a preference one lacks by many 
things other than the preference one is aiming to acquire; for instance, one can have a 
second-order preference for having a particular preference without already having the 
preferred preference. A person might wish, that is, that she cared more about the future 
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It is not clear that Elster is right about this, however. Becker makes an 
assumption, standard among economists, that is, in essence, a limita- 
tion on the rationality of particular tendencies to discount the future. 
He assumes that tendencies to discount the future must be consistent 
in the sense that one’s preferences between pairs of outcomes will not 
flip-flop over time: If the agent prefers future good Gi to future good 
G2 at t, then she will maintain the same preferential ranking at all 
other times in which the two goods both remain future; she won’t, that 
is, change her mind at some point and come to prefer G2 to GI simply 
because of the way in which she tends to discount the future. This 
assumption makes it much easier to assess the rationality of a particu- 
lar plan of conduct. From the point of view of a purely instrumental 
conception of rationality, if a plan of conduct is useful for getting Gi 
but undermines the possibility of getting G2, then it is a rational plan 
of conduct in so far as the agent prefers Gi to G2. If before the comple- 
tion of the plan the agent will come to prefer G2 to GI, even if only 
temporarily, then it becomes difficult to assess the rationality of the 
plan. In such cases, further principles of rationality need to be brought 
in to tell us how to weight the preferences of the agent at different 
times. The preferences of which temporal stages in the life of the agent 
are to be taken seriously as indicators of what the agent really prefers, 
and which are to be considered merely as indicative of passing fan- 
cies? (More on preference reversal in Section 11.) 
In order to avoid flip-flopping preferences as a result of temporal 
discounting Becker (following the standard practice in economics and 
rational choice theory) assumes that rational agents discount the fu- 
ture exponentially. This is to assume that rational tendencies to dis- 
count the future function something like the way in which one would 
rationally assign value to future payments now given a set degree of 
risk of failure to be paid. $100 now is worth more to me than $100 a 
year from now, even putting aside considerations of interest, if I think 
there is only a go percent chance that I will actually receive the $100 a 
without thereby caring about the future in much the same way as she might prefer that 
she preferred spinach to ice cream rather than the reverse without thereby preferring 
spinach to ice cream at all. h is probably false as well. At least, a claim like Pi about 
rational belief would clearly be false: one can have an irrational belief while lacking any 
kind of motivation to correct it. Why should the irrationality of a preference require 
motivation to correct it when the irrationality of a belief does not? 
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year from now. If I'm rational, I will value the $100 a year from now as 
worth $go today. Similarly, $100 two years from now is worth $81 today 
if we assume that the assurance of receiving a good that is a year away 
is always go percent. The chance that I will not receive $100 two years 
from now is 90% x go% = 81%. In general, if the payment is n years 
away, I should value it today as (.go)" of its face value, assuming that 
one year of time places acquisition of the good at risk by 10 percent." 
So, the assumption that rational agents discount the future expo- 
nentially can arise from the plausible view that temporal discounting 
is rational as a way of hedging against risk of nonpayment of future 
goods. This suggests that an agent discounts the future rationally if 
and only if the degree to which she discounts it matches the degree to 
which the futurity of a good places its acquisition at risk. But if this is 
so, then it is not clear that Becker has shown that any fully rational 
agent has ever actually ended up an addict in his sense. He has shown 
that this is theoretically possible, but whether or not it actually ever 
happens depends on whether or not the actual risk of failure to attain 
future goods prompts rational discounting of the future to the degree 
to which an agent would need to discount to end up an addict. To put 
the point more simply, it is clearly not rational to be entirely myopic, 
since there is surely less than a 100 percent chance that future goods 
will fail to be obtained. But, similarly, it is not rational, given epistemic 
limitations, not to discount the future at all, since there is some risk 
that future goods won't be obtained as expected. But whether or not 
the appropriate degree of discounting-the degree to which the future 
ought, rationally, to be discounted-will lead one into high levels of 
consumption of the sort that Becker takes to be definitive of addiction 
12. Rational choice theorists usually justify the assumption that rational agents dis- 
count the future exponentially on the grounds that exponential discounters can turn 
those who discount nonexponentially into money pumps. This is a consequence of the 
fact that nonexponential discounters may suffer flip-flops in preference during which 
time they will be willing to buy goods at rates higher than those at which they are 
willing to sell the same goods at different times. The inconsistency in one's preferences 
over time, that is, can make one into an economic victim of those with temporally 
consistent preferences. However, to avoid being a money pump, one needs only to have 
temporally consistent preferential rankings. A n  agent who discounts the future linearly, 
for instance, will, like the exponential discounter, enjoy such consistency. So, the fact 
that rational agents are not money pumps does not provide a justification for the claim 
that rational agents discount exponentially rather than discounting in any other tempo- 
rally consistent manner. 
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is yet to be determined. However, without such a determination it is 
unclear what the implications are of Becker’s model to the questions of 
the addict’s responsibility. The rational choice model of addiction en- 
courages the thought that addicts are no less responsible for their be- 
havior than any other rational agent who finds herself in a predica- 
ment in which rationality requires objectionable behavior. But if, as 
has just been argued, it is unclear that those who discount the future 
so steeply as to put themselves into a cycle of heavy usage are genu- 
inely rational, it is unclear what Becker’s model implies about the re- 
sponsibility of addicts. 
Various other objections to Becker’s model can be found in the re- 
cent literature on addiction. Ole-Jsrgen Skog, for instance, points out 
that Becker has only shown that a rational agent who heavily discounts 
the future can find himself in a lifestyle of consumption higher than 
an alternative, and better, level of consumption at which he would 
have rested had he discounted the future less heavily. But, Skog ob- 
serves, it follows that agents who actually consume very little, by ordi- 
nary standards, will count as addicted under Becker’s model if there is 
a lower level of consumption that they could have reached had they 
discounted the future less heavilye In addition, Olav Gjelsvik, Ainslie 
and Elster all argue that Becker’s model fails to account for defining 
features of addiction. Gjelsvik argues that under Becker’s model there 
is no reason to think that an addict who has managed to quit is more 
likely to relapse than any other rational agent is to consume in the first 
place. But this is clearly false: addicts have a much greater chance of 
relapsing than nonusers have of starting to use.’4 
Ainslie notes that addiction is often characterized by deep ambiva- 
lence manifested in efforts to quit that sometimes impose great costs 
on the agent. (In fact, the effort to characterize the nature of this am- 
bivalence is one of the primary motivations behind Ainslie’s own the- 
13. Skog, “Rationality, Irrationality and Addiction-Reflections on Becker and Mur- 
phy’s Theory of Addiction,” pp. 185-86. 
14. Olav Gjelsvik, “Addiction, Weakness of the Will and Relapse” in GH, pp. 48-49. 
Becker may have room to respond to Gjelsvik‘s criticism. After all, Becker points out that 
there is no reason to think that the degree to which an agent discounts the future should 
remain constant. (Gary Becker, Michael Grossman and Kevin Murphy, ‘‘Rational Addic- 
tion and the Effect of Price on Consumption,” p. 329; quoted in Elster and Skog’s intro- 
duction to GH, p. 24.1 It is quite possible that an addict may quit when she comes to 
discount the future less steeply and will relapse when she returns to her usual manner 
of discounting. 
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ory of addiction, discussed below.) The behavior of an alcoholic who 
takes the drug Antabuse, and thus guarantees herself stomach- 
wrenching sickness when she takes her next drink, is not easily ac- 
counted for under Becker’s model.’5 Is such a person really discount- 
ing the stomach pains when she takes a drink? She will suffer the 
pains, after all, precisely because she chose to take Antabuse.16 
Elster notes that certain behavioral compulsions that are thought of 
as addictions both colloquially and for purposes of treatment (most 
notably gambling addictions) are not adequately described by any 
model, of which Becker’s is just one example, that takes either toler- 
ance or the suffering of withdrawal symptoms as a result of abstention 
(the assumed mechanism behind reinforcement in Becker’s model) as 
a defining feature of addiction. Elster steps through various ways in 
which tolerance and withdrawal might be interpreted for gambling ad- 
diction-the most plausible interpretation of tolerance, for instance, is 
illustrated by the increase in size of the stake needed for a gambler to 
get the same level of excitement from the bet-and argues that none 
of the various ways of interpreting these concepts serves to identify 
adequately the distinctive mechanisms that are driving the behavior of 
the gambling addict.l7 
In addition to encountering powerful criticisms, however, in recent 
years Becker’s approach to modeling addiction has been extended in 
various ways.18 Karl Ove Moene takes an approach similar to Becker’s 
15. George Ainslie, “A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation,” LP ig (2000): 
83; idem, BW, p. 18. 
16. In addition, since rational choice theorists assume that there can be no distinc- 
tion between what one judges to be best and what one is most motivated to pursue, it is 
very difficult for the rational choice theorist to account for weakness of will at a particu- 
lar point in time. Given that assumption, how can an agent authentically judge one 
thing to be best and yet do another? For a related point, see Ainslie, SW, pp. 24-26. See 
also Gjelsvik, “Addiction, Weakness of Will and Relapse,” pp. 49-52. 
17. See Jon Elster, “Gambling and Addiction” in GH, pp. 208-34 (esp. pp. 215-17); and 
idem, SF, pp. 65-66. The point is, perhaps, even clearer in the case of certain eating 
disorders. The same degree of food deprivation has the same effect in decreasing a 
person’s weight, even if she has been depriving herself in the past. Thus, at least one 
way of understanding tolerance cannot be naturally applied to anorexics and bulimics. 
There may be other possibilities. For instance, perhaps the more the anorexic has de- 
prived herself in the past the more weightloss she requires to feel the same level of 
relief. 
18. One way in which Becker’s model has been extended is by showing that a ten- 
dency to steeply discount future goods is not the only mechanism that can lead a ratio- 
nal drug user into a lifestyle of destructively high consumption. Richard Herrnstein and 
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in order to account for the way social dynamics can influence drug 
usage within population~.~g Moene argues that groups of rational 
agents, each pursuing the best means to satisfy their preferences, can 
end up in a society in which a higher percentage of people use than 
prefer use to abstention. The overall welfare of the group is likely to be 
significantly lower if the group has a high rate of consumption, and so 
the social dynamics of drug use might be an example of the “tragedy 
of the commons”: in each individual’s hurry to satisfy her preferences, 
the preferences of the group are damaged. 
Moene generates this result from the following four, intuitively plau- 
sible, assumptions: people prefer to use when others are using, prefer 
to abstain when others are abstaining, prefer others to use when they 
are using, and prefer others to abstain when they are abstaining. Given 
these assumptions, Moene shows that there are two stable levels of 
consumption, one high, one low, where a level of consumption within 
a population is “stable” just in case it will perpetuate itself over time: If 
n percent of the population consumes at a particular time, and if n is a 
stable rate of consumption, then in the next time period the same 
percentage of people will consume. Whether a particular population 
reaches the low stable point or the high stable point depends on what 
happens when a consumer encounters a nonconsumer. Do both con- 
sume, or do both abstain? If consumption is the sufficiently frequent 
outcome of such encounters, for whatever reasons, then the society 
will soon find itself in a stable and excessively high level of consump- 
tion; if, on the other hand, the social pressures tend in the other direc- 
Drazen Prelec, “A Theory of Addiction” in CT, pp. 331-60 show for instance, that de- 
structively high levels of consumption can be reached by an otherwise rational drug 
user who ignores the fact that her behavior will lead to addiction. Such an agent need 
not discount future goods that she correctly anticipates. Instead, she ends up in a pat- 
tern of high consumption by failing to anticipate the effects of tolerance or reinforce- 
ment. There will be cases in which the kind of addiction-producing mechanism that 
Herrnstein and Prelec identify involves self-deception and so the resulting situation can- 
not be characterized as “rational addiction.” Also, Athanasios Orphanides and David 
Zervos have shown that a lifestyle of destructively high consumption can be reached by 
a rational drug user who doesn’t entirely ignore the possibility that she will become 
addicted, but underestimates the chances that the substance she consumes will cause 
tolerance and reinforce its own consumption through threat of withdrawal. (Athanasios 
Orphanides and David Zervos, “Rational Addiction with Learning and Regret,” Journal of 
Political Economy 103 [1995]: 739-58.) 
19. Karl Ove Moene, “Addiction and Social Interaction” in GH, pp. 30-46. 
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tion, a low level of consumption will be reached. Moene’s result is to 
group consumption what Becker’s is to individual consumption. The 
crucial factor for Becker that determines whether a high or low level of 
consumption is reached is the degree to which the agent discounts the 
future: the crucial factor for Moene is the degree to which social pres- 
sures-whatever factors account for the choices made in cases in 
which those who prefer to consume encounter those who do not- 
tend towards use rather than abstention.20 
Since a theory like Moene’s is primarily aimed at modeling the 
mechanisms governing group drug-consumption behavior, such theo- 
ries do not have any clear implications regarding the responsibility of 
individual addicts. However, models like Moene’s can help us to an- 
swer questions that are all but intractable without employing such a 
model, questions with immediate policy implications. For instance: 
How do the costs of obtaining a drug influence the level of drug con- 
sumption that we find within a society?21 If it can be shown that a very 
high cost for obtaining a drug will lead to a low, stable level of con- 
sumption, then that might speak in favor of tough penalties and en- 
forcement policies for offenders, or for heavy taxation on, for instance, 
20. The similarities in structure between Moene’s view and Becker’s make Moene’s 
theory subject to some of the same criticisms that have been launched against Becker’s 
view. In particular, Skog’s point that “high levels of consumption” and “low levels of 
consumption” are too gross measures by which to distinguish addicts from nonaddicts 
applies equally to Moene’s model of social consumption. A society could have what is, 
by ordinary standards, a low level of consumption of a substance whose use is subject to 
the social constraints Moene imagines even though there is a yet lower stable level of 
consumption that could be reached if social pressures weighed differently than they 
actually do. Should we say that this would be a society of drug abusers? To do so would 
be to distort our ordinary concept of drug abuse, or addiction. In addition, the sort of 
criticism developed above in the main text (under which an agent’s tendencies to dis- 
count the future are rationally assessible) can be extended to Moene’s theory. Perhaps 
there are rational ways for encounters between those who prefer use and those who 
prefer abstention to be settled. Whether or not this is so is a difficult problem in bar- 
gaining theory, but it is not clear that there are no rational standards to be brought to 
bear in the adjudication of disputes between those with conflicting preferences. How- 
ever, whatever problems the theory might encounter when interpreted as a general 
model of an addictive society of rational agents are irrelevant to the main purpose of 
Moene’s theory, which is to model the way in which social factors can result in less than 
optimal equilibria of usage, the question of the rationality or irrationality of the mem- 
bers of the society being orthogonal to this question. 
zi. See Moene, “Addiction and Social Interaction,” pp. 38-40 for a discussion of the 
implication of drug costs given his model. 
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alcohol and tobacco. Or, alternatively, a model like Moene’s might have 
the opposite implication suggesting that costs would have to be in- 
creased to impossibly high or morally objectionably high levels in 
order to produce a low, stable level of consumption. What this sug- 
gests is that the approach to understanding addiction developed by 
Becker is a powerful one, despite its limitations. 
Both the power and the limitation of the approach to addiction 
taken by classical rational choice theorists like Becker derives from the 
power and the limitation of classical rational choice theory itself. Ra- 
tional choice theory, especially when harnessed to model agential 
weaknesses such as addiction, is neither purely descriptive nor purely 
normative. It neither aims to provide an analysis of our “ordinary” 
concepts nor does it function as advice to would-be rational agents. 
Rational choice models, then, are difficult to assess philosophically. 
Whether or not they serve as adequate analyses depends on what we 
take them to be attempting to analyze, and it is not always clear what 
their target is. Still, the rational choice theorist’s model of human de- 
liberation, and the behavior in which it issues, does reflect something 
important about what might be happening when the addict acts, even 
if it does not provide answers to all of our descriptive and normative 
questions about addiction. In particular, rational choice models like 
Becker’s do accurately describe the mechanics of traps into which ra- 
tional agents may fall simply by exercising their capacities for ratio- 
nality. Whether or not the conditions that would trap a rational agent 
into non-optimal levels of consumption are actually those that drive 
the behavior of any actual, fully rational addict, is another matter. 
Without an answer to this further question, however, it is unclear what 
normative lesson to draw from the rational choice model of addiction. 
Whether or not addiction diminishes responsibility, in the context of 
rational choice theory, will depend on whether or not addictive behav- 
ior is rational behavior and, as we’ve seen, Becker’s theory, in any 
event, does not provide as clear an answer to that question as one 
would hope for. 
11. AINSLIE AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 
Rather than try to account for the addict’s behavior by employing the 
tools of traditional rational choice theory, we might, instead, model 
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addiction by denying that one or more of the assumptions underlying 
the rational choice approach are true of addicts. We might try, that is, 
to explain how a stable level of unhealthy consumption could be moti- 
vated, even in the face of knowledge that it is unhealthy, without as- 
suming full rationality on the part of the addict. This is Ainslie’s ap- 
proach.’* As we’ve seen, rational choice theorists assume that the 
discounting of future goods by a rational agent is exponential. How- 
ever, Ainslie claims that the distinctive feature of addiction is that the 
addict discounts future goods hyperbolically. 
Mathematically, hyperbolic discounting can be understood as fol- 
lows. The equation by which we calculate the value now of a future 
good under exponential discounting is of the following form: Y = 
G X CD, where Y equals present evaluation of a future good of actual 
worth G, c equals the rate at which the agent discounts the future (i.e., 
0.9, if the agent takes the acquiring of future goods to be only 90 per- 
cent assured), and D equals the delay from now until the time the 
future good will be acquired. On the other hand, the equation by 
which we calculate the value now of a future good under hyperbolic 
discounting is of the following form: Y = G/(i + D). With both expo- 
nential and hyperbolic discounting, as the delay D approaches zero, as 
the time of acquisition draws near, the value assigned to the good, Y, 
approaches its actual value, G. But there is an important difference 
between the two kinds of discounting: Consider the change in as- 
signed value of a future good over the course of the final unit of time 
before the good is acquired. Say an agent is offered $100 to be paid one 
day from now. Both the exponential and hyperbolic discounter will 
value that $100 as worth $100 when tomorrow arrives. But if you are an 
exponential discounter who weighs future goods at go percent of their 
face value, you will value $100 a day from now as worth $100 x 
o.gl = $go today. If you are a hyperbolic discounter, however, you will 
22. Ainslie has expressed his theory of motivation in a variety of places. Cf. “Deriva- 
tion of ‘Rational‘ Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount Curves” in American 
Economic Review 81 (1991): 334-40; Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Succes- 
sive Motivational States Within the Person (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); “The Dangers of Willpower: A Picoeconomic Understanding of Addiction and Dis- 
sociation” in GH, pp. 65-92; “The Intuitive Explanation of Passionate Mistakes, and W h y  
it’s Not Adequate” in ME, pp. 209-38; “A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motiva- 
tion”; BW. 
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value that same $100 as worth $ioo/(i + 1) = $50 today. So, in the 
final day before the $100 is received, the exponential discounter’s eval- 
uation only increases by $10, or 10 percent of the goods actual value, 
while the hyperbolic discounter’s evaluation increases by $50, or 50 
percent of the actual value of the good. Hyperbolic discounters care 
very little about a good until the final moments before it is available, 
during which time they experience a drastic shift in their evaluation of 
it. Exponential discounters do not experience much more of a change 
in their evaluation over the final day before the good becomes avail- 
able than they do over the next to last day, or the second to last. 
This difference between exponential and hyperbolic discounters 
suggests that hyperbolic discounting more closely approximates the 
phenomenology of craving. Someone who is subject to strong cravings 
for sugar might look forward to tonight’s dessert more at lunch than at 
breakfast as her desire for the dessert increases over the course of her 
day; but after the dinner entree is completed, and before the dessert 
arrives, she might find her desire for dessert increasing much more 
rapidly than it did in a comparable amount of time earlier in the day. 
In addition, recall that part of the motivation for thinking that a ratio- 
nal agent’s tendencies to discount the future were best modeled expo- 
nentially came from the fact that an exponential discounter’s prefer- 
ences are temporally consistent: if he ranks one outcome over another 
at one time, he will not change his ranking merely because time has 
passed. However, hyperbolic discounters will experience flip-flopping 
preferences between two future goods when the attainment of one is 
farther in the future than the other, provided that the time gap be- 
tween the two goods is such that the craving for the first will kick in 
before the craving for the second. 
Figure 1 illustrates the change over time in evaluation of two goods 
by an exponential discounter and a hyperbolic discounter. At the point 
at which the hyperbolic discounter’s evaluation curves cross, she ranks 
the two goods to be of equivalent value. Prior to that time she ranks 
the level 10 good below the level 20 good, and after that time, and 
before she attains the level 10 good, she ranks it higher than she ranks 
the level 20 good. So, she experiences a preference shift. On the other 
hand, the exponential discounter ranks the two goods similarly 
throughout the time interval, although each becomes more attractive 
in her eyes as the time of its acquisition draws closer. The problem 
197 Recent Work on Addiction 
and Responsible Agency 
faced by the hyperbolic discounter is that in the case of drug use, the 
two goods are not jointly attainable. If we think of the level 10 good as 
the pleasure received from consuming the drug, and the level 20 good 
as the good that the addict can have if she manages to avoid using at 
time 10, then it appears that a person who discounts the future hyper- 
bolically will end up taking the lesser of two goods despite the fact that 
FIGURE 1 
The x-axis is time. The y-axis is value. The dot at (10, 10) indicates a level 10 
good attainable at time 10. The dot at (12, 20) indicates a level 20 good attain- 
able at time 12. The solid lines indicate the evaluation of a hyperbolic discoun- 
ter of the two goods. The dotted lines indicate the evaluation of an exponential 
discounter of the two goods. 
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at each and every moment she acts so as to satisfy her present prefer- 
ence at the moment at which it can be satisfied. 
Hyperbolic discounting is surely irrational, and for a number of rea- 
sons: unlike the exponential discounter, there is ambiguity about what 
the hyperbolic discounter really prefers-depending on which of her 
temporal time slices we ask, we will get different answers; and unlike 
the exponential discounter, the hyperbolic discounter does not consis- 
tently assess the risk that the futurity of a good places on the chances 
of its being acq~ired.~3 Therefore, under Ainslie’s model of addiction, 
the high levels of consumption in which addicts engage are a product 
of irrationality. However, under Ainslie’s model, there is no time at 
which the addict acts contrary to her present preference. She finds 
herself in a cycle of high usage solely because of her tendency to hy- 
perbolically discount the future. 
Ainslie’s model is superior to Becker’s in a variety of respects. Most 
importantly, Ainslie is able to account for the ambivalence that many 
addicts experience. Under Becker’s model the agent is never in dis- 
agreement with herself; there is no time at which she is divided, and 
her different time-slices are also in agreement-at least, in their rank- 
ings of various outcomes. Ainslie’s addict never experiences conflict at 
a particular time; there is no time at which she can be rightly said to 
want to abstain more than consume and, at the same time, to want to 
consume more than abstain.*4 In this she is like Becker’s addict. But, 
Ainslie’s addict experiences cross-temporal conflict: there is a time at 
which she wants to abstain more than consume (when she is not in 
the grip of craving); and there is another time (while in the grip of 
craving) in which she wants to consume more than she wants to 
abstain. 
Since under Becker’s model, different time slices of oneself-the ad- 
dict during the day at work, the addict that night busy in efforts to 
score-are not in preferential disagreement, they can work together. 
At work that day, the addict might make plans to ease her efforts to 
23. In addition, unlike the exponential discounter, the hyperbolic discounter can be 
turned into a money pump by buying goods from her before she is in the grip of a 
craving and selling them back to her at inflated rates when the craving strikes. 
24. This possibility is not as analytically puzzling as it might appear. The possibility 
can be accounted for in a number of ways, most notably for our purposes by specifying 
distinct kinds of “wants.” See Section 111. 
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score that evening; she might, for instance, skip lunch so that she 
won’t have to stop at the bank machine before visiting her dealer; or, 
anticipating the aftereffects of use, she might tell her boss to expect 
her late the next day. However, the person-stages of Ainslie’s addict 
find themselves at war. When in the grip of craving, the addict takes 
steps that preclude the satisfaction of her later preference. Later she 
will wish she had stayed sober so that she could attend her child’s 
recital, but now, while her discount curve climbs steeply and crosses 
her evaluation of sober attendance of the recital, she will actively take 
steps that prevent her later self from satisfying its preference. 
This effect of preference shift suggests that an addict’s predicament 
might be understood along the lines of preferential conflict between 
individuals or nations-conflict, that is, in which satisfaction of one 
party‘s preference precludes satisfaction of the other’s. In some cases, 
such conflicts are simply settled by power: the strongest individual 
gets her way. However, such conflicts are also settled by the exploita- 
tion of opportunity: a weaker party might get her way because she gets 
to act first; such is the case, for instance, in most draft lotteries for 
professional sports teams: the team with the worst record, the weakest 
team, gets first pick of new prospects. In someone who habitually 
gives in to temptation, her tempted person-stage exploits the fact of 
her temporal priority to act for her own satisfaction before the com- 
peting sobriety-preferring self has an opportunity to act. The bind in 
which addicts find themselves is that the tempted self seems always to 
have temporal priority, and, therefore, would appear always to have 
the opportunity to satisfy her craving at the expense of the agent’s long 
term interests. Addiction, then, can appear inevitable for agents who 
discount hyperbolically. 
Addiction, however, is obviously not inevitable. Many people who 
are quite vividly aware of the immediate pleasures promised by drugs 
never engage in unhealthy levels of consumption, even though they 
do, in fact, discount hyperbolically. Ainslie accounts for this, however, 
by arguing that the appearance of inevitability derives from the as- 
sumption that the earlier tempted-self gains a decisive strategic advan- 
tage over the later-self. This is not so, however, since the right model is 
not one of preferential conflict between agents just once, but, instead, 
of repeated conflict. The temptations will subside and the untempted 
agent will find herself regretting her early choices: but she will also 
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anticipate later temptation, and can take steps to preclude her later 
tempted self from taking advantage of her time of control. 
There are a variety of mechanisms by which an untempted self can 
do her best to prevent her later self from giving in to temptation. She 
can lock the liquor cabinet, for instance. Thomas Schelling gives the 
example of a cocaine addiction clinic in which patients write a letter 
admitting their addiction that will be sent to family, friends or business 
associates should they relap~e.~s But could there be a mechanism 
through which a tempted-self could act so as to defeat the satisfaction 
of her own preference for giving in to temptation? Ainslie thinks he has 
identified a mechanism whereby a tempted-self, by recognizing her 
involvement in an iterated preferential conflict with a self who will 
enjoy motivational control prior to such control being regained by the 
tempted-self, will be led, rationally, not to act on the present tempta- 
tion. He calls the exercise of this mechanism “exercise of will,” and 
associates it with the adoption of what he calls “personal rules.”26 
The mechanism is supposed to function as follows.*7 Imagine an 
agent who has the opportunity to smoke crack every evening at 8 RM. 
When she wakes in the morning on Monday, she evaluates that eve- 
ning’s prospective high at a very low level, and values having a sober 
morning on Tuesday more highly. Since she discounts the future, she 
assigns neither option the value that it would actually have to her at 
the time it would be enjoyed, but she does rank a sober morning on 
Tuesday over a high this evening. During the course of her day, assum- 
ing she is a hyperbolic discounter, this ranking remains constant, until, 
say, 7 EM., when craving sets in, her discount curves cross, and she 
comes to rank the high at 8 P.M. over the sober morning on Tuesday. So 
far it would appear that she will use ar 8 RM. if she is endeavoring to 
satisfy her present preferences, as Ainslie, following traditional rational 
choice theory, assumes. However, the key to recognizing how she can 
avoid indulging her craving, Ainslie thinks, comes from examination of 
the preference that she has at 8 P.M. on Monday for indulgence of the 
same craving on each successive day, compared to morning-after so- 
briety Since craving for a Tuesday evening high has not yet set in on 
25. Thomas Schelling, “Self-Command A New Discipline,” in CT, p. 167. 
26. See, particularly, Ainslie, BW, pp. 78-88. 
27. For another discussion of Ainslie’s view of will power see, Ole-Jargen Skog, “Hy- 
perbolic Discounting, Willpower, and Addiction” in M E ,  pp. 151-68. 
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Monday evening, she still prefers Tuesday evening abstention to Tues- 
day evening use, and the same can be said for every day after. Further, 
if she adds together the temporally discounted expected utility of not 
using on each successive day and compares it to using on each succes- 
sive day, she finds that she is better off in the long run not using at 
all-that, after all, is one of the hallmarks of addiction: consumption 
at an unhealthy level compared to abstention. At 8 P.M. on Monday, 
then, three things are true of the agent: (1) she prefers the action of 
using right now to the action of abstaining right now, (2) she prefers 
abstention in the future, to use in the future, and (3) the preference in 
(2) is stronger than the preference in (I): she prefers never using again 
to using now. As yet, however, the relative strength of these two prefer- 
ences doesn’t motivate the agent to abstain on Monday at 8 EM. since 
the preference for present use is perfectly compatible with a prefer- 
ence for future abstention. The best way to satisfy her Monday 8 P.M. 
preferences, that is, is by using on Monday at 8 P.M. and never using 
again. Action of this sort, however, will result in a pattern of use since 
on Tuesday at 8 P.M. her best course of action will appear to be using 
on Tuesday and never using again. How can the agent make it the case 
that abstention on Monday at 8 P.M. is favored by her preference for 
future abstention over present use? Ainslie suggests that this is done 
through the adoption of “personal rules.” To adopt a personal rule is to 
conceive of your present choice as evidence of what you will choose in 
similar circumstances in the future. If you conceive of your choice in 
this way, according to Ainslie, then it will be the case that present use 
is actually incompatible with future abstention: if you use now, you 
will also use in the future. And, since you prefer future abstention to 
present use, you will thereby choose abstention now. Ainslie is recom- 
mending placing all of one’s temporally discounted evaluations of fu- 
ture abstention on the opposite side of the scale from present use. 
Although each is of very small value, there will be many of them, and 
so they can outweigh the very high value assigned to present use. This 
is only possible if present use precludes the possibility of future ab- 
stention. Ainslie claims that for those who adopt personal rules, this is 
true, and thus the adoption of personal rules is a means of manipulat- 
ing one’s present preferences for future abstention in order to avoid 
the shortsighted preference for present use. Those who manage to act 
in accordance with personal rules, and thereby overcome temptation, 
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are rational agents, according to Ainslie. They manage to motivate 
themselves in such a way as to overcome the weaknesses induced by 
hyperbolic discounting.28 
Ainslie gives a prominent role in the mechanism of “willpower” to 
the belief that a choice at a particular time is an indicator of what one 
will choose at future times. It is important to Ainslie’s position, how- 
ever, that the belief is not irrational. If it were irrational, then “will- 
power” would be a way of inducing one kind of irrationality in oneself 
so as to overcome the irrational weakness induced by hyperbolic dis- 
counting. But if we were looking for a mechanism whereby an agent 
could overcome temptations even while slipping into irrationality, we 
might as well just say that the best way for an agent to overcome her 
powerful temptation to use is simply to abstain, period. To be sure, 
this would be irrational (she would be acting contrary to her stongest 
preference) but if we allow irrationality into the picture, there is no 
reason to point to complicated rule-based irrational mechanisms for 
overcoming temptation; simpler irrational mechanisms would do just 
as wek29 
Michael Bratman has argued that there is no reason to think that an 
agent is generally under rational pressure to think that her choice now 
is an indicator of what she will choose in the f~ture.3~ There are, to be 
sure, cases in which a choice on Monday to violate a rule is very good 
evidence that the agent will not follow the rule in the future, evidence 
that no rational agent could ignore. We can imagine a world, for in- 
28. Howard Rachlin, The Science of Self-control (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, ~ O O O ) ,  thinks of successful exercises of self-control as the initiation of patterns of 
behavior that supplant other, less healthy, patterns. Although Rachlin places no strong 
emphasis on the preference shifts experienced by hyperbolic discounters, he does take 
hyperbolic discounting seriously, and there are strong affinities between his views and 
Ainslie’s. In addition, Rachlin’s book is of particular interest for its thorough examination 
of recent empirical work in behavioral psychology regarding the effectiveness of various 
techniques for overcoming patterns of unhealthy behavior. 
29. Ainslie holds that the belief that one’s present choice is decisive evidence about 
what one will choose in the future is self-fulfilliig: if one has it, then it is more likely to 
be true than if one lacks it. (See BW, p. 88.) However, even if the belief does sometimes 
cause the conditions that make it true, this fact is only relevant if the causal chain 
passes in the right way through the agent’s capacities for rationality. This point is elabo- 
rated below in the main text. 
30. Michael Bratman, “Planning and Temptation” in Faces of Intention: Selected Es- 
says on Intention and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, iggg), pp. 35-57. 
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stance, in which there is decisive evidence that there are only two 
kinds of agents: those who always choose to use and those who always 
choose to abstain. If an agent rationally believes that there are only 
these two kinds of people, then she can expect that should she violate 
a rule against use now, she will also do so in the future. But the condi- 
tions specified in this example do not necessarily hold. The only kinds 
of circumstances relevant to Ainslie’s project that would also place an 
agent under rational pressure to expect her future-self to act as her 
present-self is acting, are those circumstances that are logically re- 
quired by a presumption of rationality on the part of the agent. For 
instance, the presumption of rationality implies that the agent will act 
according to her best reasons, so if choosing to violate the rule against 
use on Monday at 8 EM. would give a future-self a decisive reason to 
use Tuesday at 8 P.M., then the agent would be under rational pressure 
on Monday to abandon an expectation of abstention on the part of the 
Tuesday-self should she choose to use on Monday. 
Bratman notes that past abstention doesn’t generally give an agent 
reason to abstain now, so it is no condition of rationality that a choice 
of abstention encourage an expectation of future abstention. What fol- 
lows is that an agent has no reason to expect a choice of abstention on 
Monday to contribute to her gaining the long-term anticipated re- 
wards of abstention, and so she has no reason to abstain on Monday. If 
Bratman is right, then Ainslie has not identified a mechanism that will 
help a rational agent to overcome temptation. However, Alfred Mele 
has argued that there is a large class of cases in which past abstention 
does provide strong reason to abstain, and, he claims, cases of addic- 
tion are often of this s0rt.3~ In the kinds of cases Mele has in mind, to 
use in the face of past abstention would be to waste the effort spent on 
past abstenti0n.3~ If, for instance, in order to be released on your own 
31. Alfred Mele, “Addiction and Self-Control,” Behavior and Philosophy, 24 (1996): gg- 
117 (henceforth BpI. 
32. Both Mele and Bratman in his description of Mele’s examples (see Bratman, 
“Planning and Temptation,” p. 49 n. zi) talk about past abstention as providing an agent 
with a reason to abstain by encouraging her that she will refrain in the future and 
thereby reap the benefits of continued abstention. Notice, however, that the encourage- 
ment provided by past abstention is not crucial to such examples. All that matters is that 
one cannot gain the goods promised by past abstention if one doesn’t abstain now, and 
so the fact that one abstained in the past gives one further reason to abstain now. Antici- 
pating this gives one’s earlier self a reason to abstain that is rooted in the expectation 
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recognizance you need to be clean for thirty consecutive days, then 
days of past abstention are like money in the bank that would be 
squandered entirely by using today33 In such cases, a rational agent 
can expect abstention now to give reason to her future self to abstain; 
this in turn grounds an expectation of future abstention, which, in 
turn, allows one to take the goods of continued abstention into one’s 
rational deliberations about what to do now.34 
However, even in cases in which Ainslie’s mechanism of willpower 
that one’s future self will appreciate the reason-giving force of one’s abstention now and, 
therefore, will abstain. 
33. Contestants on “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” face situations of this sort. With 
each right answer the possible reward increases, but with a single wrong answer the 
contestant leaves with some lower reward. So, a contestant who has answered enough 
questions correctly will have to choose between answering a question or not answering 
it where a correct answer earns him $i,ooo,ooo; not answering will earn him $ ~ O O , O O O ;  
and answering incorrectly will earn him only $3z,ooo. In choosing whether or not to 
answer the question, the contestant is given an incentive, the possibility of leaving with 
$i,ooo,ooo, to risk wasting his past correct answers, which are worth $468,000. 
34. Mele has also argued that the kinds of cases in which Ainslie’s “personal rules” do 
provide a rational agent with the tools for resisting present temptation-those in which 
to violate the rule would be to waste past efforts that led to successfully following it-are 
closer to the predicament of the addict than the kinds of cases in which personal rules 
do no good (BP, 107). Mele is probably right about this in the case of nicotine, but it is 
less clear in the case of other more dramatically and immediately damaging drugs. The 
primary problem with smoking is the long term negative effects on one’s health. Further, 
the nicotine addict knows that a week of abstention will do little for his long term health 
if he returns to smoking today. That is, the value of past abstention is lost at the point of 
relapse. The smoker who quit and starts again goes back to “square one.” (This may be 
even clearer in cases of compulsive overeating.) But compare the case of nicotine to the 
case of crack. While it’s true that some of the goods of past abstention are lost with 
relapse-abstention from crack does have an incremental positive effect on long term 
health that can be ruined by relapse-these goods are minor compared to other goods 
obtained through abstention the acquisition of which do not depend on past abstention. 
By abstaining today, for instance, the crack addict avoids the degrading things that she 
does for another hit once she has run out of money to pay for it. These goods are gained 
just by abstaining now, and do not depend on past abstention. In cases of this sort, 
Ainslie’s model of the mechanism of willpower cannot help a rational agent to overcome 
temptation, and for the reasons that Bratman suggests. While the fact of past abstention 
might give the agent some reason to abstain now, it is a very weak reason indeed and 
not one that will support an earlier expectation of later abstention. If anything will pre- 
vent the crack addict from giving in to temptation, it must be reflection on the horrible 
things that she will do for more once in the grip of the drug. But if she discounts these 
evils hyperbolically, as on Ainslie’s model, there is no reason to think a rational agent 
capable of giving them the weight in her present deliberations needed to topple the 
attractions of use. 
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does help a rational agent to overcome temptations produced through 
hyperbolic discounting, there is reason to think that what Ainslie has 
identified is not actually “willpower” in the sense in which we usually 
think of it. In fact, the best reasons for thinking that Ainslie is not 
talking about the will at all come from some of the very effects of 
adoption of personal rules that he articulates in his recent work. As 
Ainslie summarizes his examination of the effects of using “willpower” 
in his sense, “Nothing fails like success.” (BW, pp. i4iff.l That is, Ainslie 
identifies a variety of fascinating psychological mechanisms through 
which the adoption of personal rules results in alienation, disassocia- 
tion and even the development of compulsive disorders structurally 
very similar to addictions.35 
Ainslie distinguishes compulsion and addiction as follows: An ad- 
dict suffers preference shifts due to hyperbolic discounting at intervals 
of hours or days, while a compulsive suffers the same preference shifts 
at intervals of weeks or m0nths.3~ The adoption of personal rules 
serves the interests of longer-term goods over short-term goods, and 
so personal rules could be harnessed to serve compulsive cravings 
over addictive cravings, even though the agent’s longest-term welfare 
would be best served if she were to overcome her compulsive cravings 
as well. So, for instance, you might find yourself, each evening after 
dinner, preferring to leave the dishes until the next day, even though 
before dinner you prefer to do them that evening, and regret the next 
morning having left them to the cockroaches. To fight against this lazy 
craving, you might adopt a rule, “Do the dishes right after dinner,” and 
thereby provide yourself with the greater rewards of a clean, cock- 
roach-free kitchen. But there are also advantages to flexibility: enjoying 
time with friends whom you’ve had over for dinner, rather than busily 
doing dishes, might be worth the added costs of dealing with the mess 
in the morning, even if it is not worth it to wait on nights in which you 
35. Ainslie discussed the negative side-effects of willpower in Picoeconomics: The 
Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within tbe Person, cf. pp. 205-13. 
His examination of these negative side-effects has been substantially extended in his 
more recent work. See, especially, “The Dangers of Willpower: A Picoeconomic Under- 
standing of Addiction and Dissociation” and BW; pp. 143-97 
36. SW, pp. 48-51. In a fascinating section of BW (pp. 54-61), Ainslie argues that 
pains are addictions in which the temporal gap between cravings is almost instan- 
taneous. Thus, Ainslie thinks of pain, addiction and compulsion as being on a 
continuum. 
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don’t have company. By overcoming the dangers brought on by hyper- 
bolically discounting the goods of a clean kitchen, you come to “crave” 
the act of following the rule, even when you will regret, the next day, 
having not enjoyed your friends’ company. You don’t, that is, neces- 
sarily confront the rule “Do the dishes right after dinner” with the 
goods gained through following the rule “Do the dishes right after din- 
ner except when you have company,” and so you end up giving in to 
the short term preference for avoiding laziness over the longer term 
preference for enjoying your friends. The tool for solving your craving 
for laziness, the adoption of the rule for doing the dishes, becomes an 
affliction; you become a compulsive dish washer.37 
Ainslie thinks that results of this nature show only that “willpower” 
is a relatively blunt tool for solving the problems that hyperbolic dis- 
counting engenders. However, it is possible that what these results 
really show is that the motivational mechanisms that Ainslie dubs “the 
will” are really not to be equated with the will at all. I explain. 
There is a long tradition of distinguishing the will from desire. To 
have a will is to be capable of directing one’s conduct contrary to all, 
or at least many, of one’s desires. As intuitive as this distinction is, it is 
far from obvious what it really amounts to. Since desires can be 
brought into motivational combat with other desires, showing that an 
agent is motivated contrary to a particular prominent desire is not 
sufficient to show that the moving force behind her conduct is to be 
equated with the will: she might just be acting on another desire. A 
more important distinction between desire and the will is this: Where 
desires place us under equivalent rational pressure either to act as they 
direct or to give them up, acts of will place us under greater rational 
pressure to act as they direct. Someone who abandons her desire to go 
to Paris is no less rational than someone who wants to go and books a 
ticket with Air France. However, someone who intends to go to Paris, 
or chooses to go to Paris, owes us more of an explanation if she aban- 
dons her intention or her choice than if she takes steps to do as it 
directs. Similarly, if I tell you that I intend to spend the weekend in 
Paris, you can count on me doing so with greater surety, if I am ratio- 
37. What Ainslie is offering here is closely analogous to a well-known criticism of 
Kantian ethics, namely, that the rule-based conception of the best life that the Kantian 
advocates results in an inappropriate subordination of one’s own personal projects and 
interests. 
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nal, than you can if I merely say that I want to. What this suggests is 
that exercises of will are a product of our rational capacities in a way 
mere desires are not. Both direct us towards conduct, but since exer- 
cises of will spring in some way from rationality itself, they place us 
under rational pressure to do as they direct that desires do n0t.3~ 
There is great truth, that is, to the Aristotelian-Scholastic equation be- 
tween will and “rational appetite.” 
Exercises of will in Ainslie’s sense, however, do not obey this asym- 
metry with other forms of motivation. Since, ultimately, exercises of 
will are merely preferences for particular patterns of conduct brought 
to weigh in against preferences for single and immediate outcomes, 
they have no greater rational status than the preferences they are to 
combat. An agent who abandoned one preference or the other would 
be no less rational than one who acted to satisfy it instead. In fact, 
Ainslie’s observations to the effect that employment of his mechanisms 
of willpower often results in alienation and compulsive rule-following 
bears this point out. Any account of the will ought to respect the fact 
that the arationality of desire and the connections between the will 
and rationality are such that when the will topples desire it has a ratio- 
nal justification available. It hasn’t just won a battle through force, it 
38. There are a wide variety of different ways to account for the connection between 
the will and rationality At the extreme, we might think, as Kant did, that to will is to 
direct conduct in accordance with categorical principles of action dictated by the very 
nature of practical reason. (Cf. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Nornativity [Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 19961, esp. Lecture 3.) At the other extreme is a view 
that accounts for the difference between will and desire by taking the will to be a special 
species of desire and then arguing that the species-defining characteristic suggests that 
acts of will are connected with our capacities for rationality in a way in which other 
desires are not. One might, for instance, associate the will with the strongest desire and 
then argue that there are rational grounds to act in accordance with the strongest desire 
that do not apply to desires across the board. Or, more promisingly, one might associate 
the will with the desire to act in accordance with reasons. (Cf. J. David Velleman, “What 
Happens When Someone Acts?” in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, John Fischer 
and Mark Ravizza eds. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19931, pp. 188-zio.) Between 
these two extremes are a variety of other positions. One might, for instance, take acts of 
will to be mental states distinct from desire that play certain special roles in practical 
reason, and thus are governed by principles of rationality that do not govern desires, 
without thereby associating the will with practical reason itself. (Cf. Michael Bratman, 
“Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention” in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays 
on Intention and Agency, pp. 58-90.) Clearly, a full discussion of these issues cannot be 
undertaken here. 
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also has right on its side. For all that, of course, one might wish that 
desire had won; there might be a strong sense of loss, but it cannot be 
a sense of loss for which good reasons can be given, for desire lacks 
the rational basis that exercises of will enjoy. However, on Ainslie’s 
model of the will, the compulsion and alienation that the agent en- 
dures as a result of mastering temptation is no more supported by 
reasons than her conduct would have been had she given in to temp- 
tation. She has really just traded one unhealthy cycle for another. 
Since the compulsion into which she has fallen and the addiction she 
has left behind both have their roots in the same irrational tendency 
(the tendency to discount the future hyperbolically) Ainslie does not 
have room within his theory to make the kind of distinction in ratio- 
nality between them that is required to make a convincing case for the 
claim that the adoption of personal rules is really to be equated with 
exercise of will. The person who exercises willpower, in Ainslie’s sense, 
has not genuinely confronted passion with reason-instead she has 
just confronted one passion with another and so she has not, in fact, 
exercised her will, truly speaking, at all.39 
In denying that the addict’s affliction involves a subversion of her 
rationality, the traditional rational choice theorists, like Becker, fail to 
account for many of the most important features of addicts that distin- 
guish them from the unaddicted. In conceiving addictive motivation to 
spring from irrational tendencies that plague all forms of motivation, 
Ainslie fails to provide an adequate account of the way in which the 
will can be a genuine source of rational motivation. When we look to a 
model of addictive behavior for guidance regarding the sense and de- 
gree in which the responsibility of addicts is diminished, the failing of 
Ainslie’s theory appears serious. From the point of view of assessing 
responsibility, the attraction of a view that presents addictive behavior 
as a product of irrationality is its promise to help to distinguish addic- 
tive behavior from the worst kind of deliberate immoral or illegal be- 
39. R. Jay Wallace, “Addiction as Defect of Will,” LP 18: 621-54, suggests that no ac- 
count of addictive motivation will be adequate that fails to give a special motivational 
role to the will as a motivating capacity different from desire. In arguing for this claim, 
he writes that by exercising the will, ‘‘ . . . persons can bring about a kind of rational 
action that is not merely due to fortuitious coincidence of rational judgment and given 
desire, but that is a manifestation of the very capacities that make them, distinctively, 
agents.” (pp. 637-38). 
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havior. However, Ainslie’s view does not provide us with the needed 
contrast, for the central motivational mechanism behind addiction- 
hyperbolic discounting-is endemic to addicts and nonaddicts alike. 
Those who avoid giving in to addictive temptations do so through the 
exercise of the very same form of irrational mechanism that plague 
addicts and consequently there is no meaningful sense in which they 
are more rational when they act wrongly than addicts are. As psycho- 
logically rich as Ainslie’s model of the addicted agent is, it remains too 
impoverished to confront the pressing normative questions about the 
addict’s responsibility. 
111. VISCERAL FACTORS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
COMPULSION AND WEAKNESS 
While Ainslie denies that one of the central features of traditional ra- 
tional choice theory‘s picture of the rational agent (the tendency to 
discount future goods exponentially) is true of addicts, he accepts an- 
other assumption of the traditional rational choice model an equa- 
tion, at any given time, between an agent’s evaluative rankings and her 
motivating p~eferences.4~ Rational choice theorists, that is, tend to as- 
sume that what a person judges to be best is what she prefers most 
and vice versa.“ This might be true of fully rational agents, but it is not 
clear that it is true of addicts, and it could be that to understand ad- 
diction we need to understand how evaluation and motivation can 
pull apart.@ Although they do not put it in quite this way, George 
40. There is room in Ainslie’s theory to pull these two things apart, but there is not 
room to do so while giving any meaninglid motivational role to evaluations. An agent 
might judge a future good to be worth a merely exponentially discounted value, while 
“feeling” attracted to it to a hyperbolically discounted degree. However, Ainslie is com- 
mitted to the claim that it is only the hyperbolicaUy discounted feeling that actually 
influences present behavior. The exponentially discounted judgment does not compete 
in the marketplace of motivation. 
41. Sometimes the assumption is thought to be essential to a naturalistic conception 
of human motivation. It is sometimes thought, that is, that a causal theory of the mo- 
tivational role of evaluations requires an equation between one’s preferences and one’s 
judgments. Alfred Mele, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-con- 
trol (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 31-49 argues for the compatibility of a 
causal theory of agency and the view that evaiuative judgments have a different motiva- 
tional role from one’s desire-based preferences. 
42. As an historical note, John Locke felt that motivation and evaluation had to be 
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Loewenstein’s contribution of the “visceral factors” view of addiction, 
and Jon Elster’s development of it, help to show how this might be 
possible. 
Loewenstein has coined the term “visceral factors” to describe mo- 
tivational influences that fall into one of three categories: drives (such 
as hunger and sexual desire), emotions (such as anger and jealousy), 
and bodily sensations (such as pains and itches).43 The visceral factors 
in motivation are contrasted with “higher level” motivating factors, 
where these are understood to be motives that are “cognitively medi- 
ated.” Elster has specified in some detail what such “cognitive media- 
tion” involves and has recognized that some visceral factors, especially 
emotions, also involve cognitive mediation in the weak sense that they 
are sensitive to the agent’s beliefs.44 Since the visceral factors and the 
cognitive factors compete to guide every agent’s behavior, Loewenstein 
and Elster are going against the usual assumption of rational choice 
theory eliding the evaluational and the motivational. Our evaluative 
judgments, which are cognitive factors in motivation, can influence 
behavior independently from the influence of the visceral, or purely 
appetitive, motives. Where the addicted differ from the unaddicted is 
in their susceptibility to powerful visceral factors. Loewenstein and 
Elster understand addiction, that is, to be an acquired susceptibility to 
visceral motives directing the agent towards that to which she is 
addicted. 
Loewenstein has also done interesting empirical work indicating 
that, in fact, people are very bad at predicting the likelihood that they 
will act as directed by a visceral motive when they are not experienc- 
ing it. People who are not sexually aroused, for instance, underesti- 
mate the motivational efficacy of future sexual arousal.45 What this 
distinguished in order to account for cases of weakness of will. See John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Peter Nidditch ed. (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975)~ 
pp. 252-64 (book 2, chap. 21, sec. 35-47). For discussion, see Gideon Yaffe, Liberty Worth 
the Name: Lode on Free Agency (Princeton, Princeton University Press, aooo), pp. 32-61. 
43. Loewenstein has presented his “visceral factors” view in a number of different 
places. Cf. “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior,” Oqpnizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes 65 (1996): 272-92; “A Visceral Account of Addiction” in 
GH, pp. 235-64; “Will-Power: A Decision Theorist’s Perspective,” LP ig (1999): 51-76. 
44. Cf. Elster, SF, pp. 31-35. 
45. Cf. George Loewenstein, Daniel Nagin and Raymond Paternoster, “The Effect of 
Sexual Arousal on Predictions of Sexual Forcefulness,” Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 3-4 (1997): 443-73. 
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suggests is that the tendency to discount future goods in one’s present 
motivation may be a product of the influence of visceral factors. Before 
the craving for the drug sets in at 7 P.M. tonight, the agent expects 
herself to be more motivated by the desire to have a sober morning 
the next day only because she underestimates the degree to which she 
will be moved by her visceral craving when it sets in. Hyperbolic tem- 
poral discounting, then, under Loewenstein and Elster’s view, is a 
symptom of addiction rather than a defining feature of it.4‘j 
This view provides a natural way of distinguishing addictions from 
compulsions that differs importantly from the way in which Ainslie 
drew the distinction. Since Ainslie makes no principled distinction be- 
tween motives-all of the relevant motivationally effective mental 
states are preferences-he distinguishes addiction and compulsion 
through appeal to temporal factors: both are periodic cravings, which 
differ only with respect to the length of time between cravings. Ac- 
cording to the visceral factors position, however, one distinctive fea- 
ture of addictions is their appetitive nature and in this they might dif- 
fer importantly from compulsions. The driving motive of a compulsive 
handwasher, for instance, might be to rid herself of guilt, while the 
driving motivation of an addicted smoker is an appetite much like her 
appetite for water or air.47 
Loewenstein’s and Elster’s positions do not differ substantially from 
the view adopted by Gary Watson in his important 1975 paper “Free 
Agency.”4* Although he has repudiated some aspects of the position 
since,49 Watson there argued that there are two distinct types of mo- 
tivation corresponding to the two “parts of the soul” described by 
Plato: the appetitive and the rational. Watson went on to claim that in 
addiction, appetite wins the battle with evaluation in guiding the 
agent’s behavior, and that this fact is the crucial feature of addiction by 
virtue of which it undermines responsible agency. This position en- 
counters a formidable problem. Under the account, there appears to 
46. Elster, then, would agree that a tendency to discount the future can count as 
irrational if it is a product of a nonrational, visceral motive, even though he thinks that 
tendencies to discount the future cannot count as irrational merely because of their 
“steepness,“ or some other feature of the temporal discounting function. 
47. Things are complicated by the fact that compulsions will often “hijack” appetites. 
So, for instance, the compulsive overeater may experience the compulsive desire as an 
appetite. Still, in such cases the deepest motivation for the behavior is not appetitive. 
48. Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205-20. 
49. Idem, “Free Action and Free Will,” Mind 96 (1987): 149-50. 
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be no meaningful motivational distinction between unfree choice and 
weak-willed choice. Both are rightly described as the victory of the 
appetitive over the evaluative the visceral over the cognitively medi- 
ated, to use Loewenstein’s terms. 
The problem has immediate implications with regard to respon- 
sibility for behavior stemming from addiction. Compulsion genuinely 
excuses from responsibility; e.g., someone with Tourette’s syndrome 
who blurts out obscenities at a fancy dinner party deserves no rebuke. 
But weakness only diminishes responsibility, without eliminating it en- 
tirely. Someone who gives in to irrational impulses is certainly less to 
blame than someone who coldly and rationally plots objectionable 
conduct, but she is, nonetheless, to some degree blameworthy. The 
distinction between first and second degree murder, for instance, is 
not without a rationale. It is then imperative for a theory of addiction 
to tell us whether addicts are to be classified as compulsive or weak, 
and the theory advocated by Loewenstein, Elster and by Watson in the 
mid-1970s does not seem, at first glance at least, to do the tr i~k.5~ 
One might try to overcome this problem by claiming that the differ- 
ence between the weak-willed and the unfree is that the weak-willed 
remain capable of guiding their behavior in accordance with their 
evaluative judgments, while the unfree do not. As Watson put the sug- 
gestion in his 1977 follow-up paper, “ m e  are inclined to contrast 
weakness and compulsion like so: in the case of compulsive acts, it is 
not so much that the will is too weak as that the contrary motivation is 
too strong; whereas, in weakness of will properly so-called, it is not 
that the contrary motivation is too strong, but that the will is too 
weak.”5l However, Watson argues persuasively against this way of con- 
trasting the unfree and the weak-willed, when the term “strength”, as 
applied to the will or to desire, is understood to be identifying a degree 
of causal force (PR, pp. 326-29). The problem is clearest when the dis- 
tinction between strong and weak desires is made in the following 
way: strong desires win out over evaluative judgments and weak de- 
50. This problem is brought out very nicely in Kadri Vihvelin, “Stop Me Before I Kill 
Again,” Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 115-48. See esp. pp. 124-30. 
51. Gary Watson, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will,” Philosophical Review 86 
(1977): 327, henceforth PR. In this remark, Watson uses the term “the will” to refer to the 
agent’s “practical judgment” (ibid.), or her evaluation of what is, all things considered, 
best for her to do. 
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sires do not. Under this analysis, to deem a desire to be “strong” is a 
post hoc way of noting that the agent acted in accordance with it in- 
stead of in accordance with her evaluative judgment. But under this 
account of “strength” there still remains no meaningful distinction be- 
tween those whose freedom is diminished by their desires and those 
who give in to them only through weakness; in both cases, the appe- 
tite, or the visceral factor, was “too strong” to resist. 
There are, to be sure, subtler ways of drawing the distinction be- 
tween strong and weak desires. In his recent work, Watson has consid- 
ered, for instance, efforts to do so by appealing to the agent’s suscep- 
tibility to countervailing ~onsiderations.5~ For instance, a desire is 
strong enough to count as compulsive, on such an account, if the 
agent would still act as it dictates even if given good reason not to. 
Watson has pointed out that instances in which agents turn away from 
a particular course of conduct when given a reason to are only in- 
stances of weakness rather than compulsion if it can be shown that the 
agent turns away from the course of conduct specified by her desire 
because she recognizes the reasons to do so and responds to them 
appropriately. For instance, the fact that a heroin addict would not 
take steps to satisfy her craving for heroin should she have to s w i m  to 
do so doesn’t show that she chooses heroin weakly rather than com- 
pulsively, since she might be a hydrophobe. The response to reasons 
to act counter to the dictate of a desire must, itself, not be com- 
pulsively motivated.53 But if we were able to specify what it was to 
recognize countervailing reasons and respond to them appropriately, 
rather than in the way that the hydrophobe does, we would already 
have a good test for determining whether or not the agent was 
52. As Watson points out, proposals of this sort can be found in the literature. Cf. 
John Fischer, The Metaphysics ofFree Wd (Oxford Blackwell, igg& p. 94. 
53. Alfred Mele, “Irresistible Desires” in Nous 24 (1990): 455-72, makes a similar point 
in discussion of Wright Neely’s closely related account of irresistible desire. Neely says 
that a desire is irresistible if and only if an agent who recognized a good and sufficient 
reason not to act on it would still act on it (“Freedom and Desire,” Philosophical Review 
83 [1974]: 32-54]. But Mele points out that an agent’s desire would then count as irresist- 
ible if the recognition of a good and sufficient reason not to act on it gave him a fatal 
heart attack (see Mele, “Irresistible Desires,” p. 456). The point is very similar to Wat- 
son’s: any counterfactual test must specify that the reason-action relation is normal in 
the counterfactual circumstance. But if we could specify what normality of this sort 
consists in we wouldn’t need the counterfactual test in the first place. 
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responding weakly or compulsively when she acts contrary to what 
she judges to be best and would not require an appeal to responsive- 
ness to countervailing reasons. That is, a test for determining whether 
or not a person acted compulsively that appeals to noncompulsive re- 
sponsiveness to countervailing reasons is viciously circular, but with- 
out such a qualification the test seems not to draw the compulsive- 
weak lines in the way it should.54 
However, in response to concerns of this sort Elster and, in a similar 
way, John Fischer and Mark Ravizza have offered subtler ways of iden- 
tifying compulsion-inducing desires by appeal to sensitivity to coun- 
tervailing reasons. Both Elster, on the one hand, and Fischer and Rav- 
izza, on the other, suggest that agents must exhibit a willingness to 
turn away from desire when given reason to do so in a consistent and 
coherent pattern, if her acting in accordance with that desire is a man- 
ifestation of weakness rather than compulsion.55 The problem, that is, 
with the hydrophobic heroin addict is that she would not choose her- 
oin if it required her swimming, but would choose it if it required her 
to suffer other evils that are, by all rational measures, just as bad or 
worse. The remaining problem, however, is to specify which patterns 
of response to incentives are rational and which are not. It would be 
54. Gary Watson, “Disordered Appetites,” pp. 7-9. Here is another way to see the 
problem that Watson is raising: An analysis of the weak-compulsive distinction through 
appeal to susceptibility to Countervailing reasons would have to overcome the fact that 
addicts are often susceptible to some countervailing reasons, even if they are not as 
susceptible as the rest of us; a sufficiently severe threat might keep the addict on course 
even if a weaker threat, sufficient to keep the unaddicted from using, wouldn’t do the 
trick. But what is the difference between a weak countervailing reason and a strong one? 
The worry is that the distinction between strong and weak countervailing reasons is just 
the distinction between the compulsive and the weak reappearing in a different place. 
55. Elster puts this test entirely in monetary terms: If the agent would act contrary to 
her desire when offered a certain amount of money, or any greater amount, then she 
merely acts weakly. However, Elster proposes this as only a sufficient condition. (See 
Elster, SE pp. 140-41.) Alternative sufficient conditions could be devised for agents who 
don’t care much about money, or who have reasons not to think better of more of it. 
Whatever the reasons are that would draw an agent away from her desire, she must 
respond to such reasons in a coherent pattern. Someone might, for instance, choose 
contrary to her desire if offered $1,000 to do so, but not if offered $io,ooo while still 
showing herself to be responsive to reasons; say she knows that after accepting money 
above $9,999 she would be audited by the IRS. In accordance with examples of this sort, 
a more general recipe for the construction of Sufficient conditions is supplied in John 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 65-91. 
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circular to appeal, at this point, to responsiveness to countervailing 
reasons. But neither Elster nor Fischer and Ravizza provide an alterna- 
tive acc0unt.5~ The worry is that any adequate account will involve a 
circular appeal to an unanalyzed distinction between compulsive and 
merely weak choice making. There is surely more work to be done 
here, but in the absence of a noncircular specification of a distinction 
between rational and irrational patterns of choice making we are stil l  
in need of an account of “strength” of desire that will serve to distin- 
guish between the compulsive and the merely weak.57 
In his i g n  paper, and also in his most recent work, Watson suggests 
that there is truth to the claim that the weak have weak wills and the 
compulsive have strong motives if “strength” of motivation is under- 
stood normatively; to say that one suffers under desires so strong as to 
induce compulsion is simply to say that those desires are not ones we 
expect morally upright agents to deny. The reverse is true in the case 
of weakne~s.5~ Watson’s proposal involves a further, and yet more radi- 
cal departure from the approach of rational choice theory than any- 
thing advocated even by Loewenstein and Elster. AU the theorists 
whose views are under discussion here, with the exception of Watson, 
assume that the question “How does the behavior of an addict differ 
56. In correspondence, Fischer has suggested that this problem could be overcome 
through appeal to a criterion of “mechanism individuation.” For Fischer and Ravizza, 
that is, the relevant question is whether an agent who acted from the very same mecha- 
nism on which she actually acted would be moved by countervailing considerations. 
But, Fischer is suggesting, cases like the hydrophobic heroin addict might involve a 
witch in motivational mechanism. The mechanism that leads her to actually take her- 
oin, that is, is not the same as the mechanism that leads her to choose not to when she 
would have to endure the water to do so. Fischer is well aware that there are serious 
challenges that an adequate criterion of mechanism individuation would have to meet. 
For our purposes here it is necessary to note only one: whatever criterion one produces 
it must not distinguish between the actual mechanism on which the heroin addict acts 
and the hydrophobic mechanism that would lead her not to choose to take heroin by 
appealing to the fact that the latter, and not the former, leads to compulsively made 
choices. To specify the criterion of individuation in this way would be to argue in the 
same viciously circular manner identified by Watson. 
57. A n  important recent discussion of strength of motivation is Mele, “Motivational 
Strength,” in Nous 32 (1998): 23-36. See also Mele, “Strength of Motivation and Being in 
Control: Learning from Libet,” in American Philosophical Quarterly34 (1997): 319-33. 
58. See Watson, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will,” p. 331, and idem “Disordered 
Appetites,” p. 11. Although Watson does make t h i s  proposal, he adds that he is “sure it is 
unsatisfactory as it stands.” (Ibid., p. 11.) 
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from the behavior of the unaddicted?” takes priority over the question 
“Does addiction diminish responsibility?” They think that the first 
question can be answered without answering the second, although not 
vice versa. However, by claiming that the compulsive-weak distinction 
is a normative one, Watson is denying this. The theory of addiction 
(the model of the behavior of the addict) cannot tell us, all by itself, 
whether the agent is to be excused entirely from responsibility (as she 
would be if she is acting unfreely) or if she is to be assigned merely 
diminished responsibility (as she would be if she is acting merely irra- 
tionally). In order to draw the compulsive-weak distinction, we must 
ask and answer a normative question; we must ask whether we think it 
objectionable that she acted contrary to her evaluative judgment in 
this instance. Is that fact indicative of a failing on her part? If it is then 
she is weak; if it is not, then she is compulsive.59 
It may be correct to draw the compulsive-weak distinction nor- 
matively. However, notice that doing so doesn’t yet help us to under- 
stand our initial dilemma: we started by asking what it was about ad- 
diction that diminished the responsibility of the afflicted agent for 
conduct stemming from her affliction. The answer supplied by a “vis- 
ceral factors” account is this: addicts are acting from motives that are 
not products of rational capacities; their conduct is controlled by the 
appetitive, rather than the evaluative, part of the soul. But when we are 
asked what the implications are for responsibility-does this imply 
that addicts are weak or does it imply they are compulsive?-we are 
told that the compulsive-weak distinction is drawn through determin- 
ing which way of regarding the addict involves a correct assessment of 
responsibility. The account of addiction, then, is not providing justi- 
fication for treating addicts as compulsive rather than weak, or weak 
rather than compulsive; instead, the account remains silent on the 
question, leaving it to be dictated by which responsibility assessment 
is appropriate. In the absence, then, of another, nonnormative way of 
59. Watson’s way of drawing the weak-compulsive contrast fits nicely with the view 
of freedom of will recently offered in Gideon Yaffe, ”Free Will and Agency at Its Best” in 
Philosophical Perspectives, 14: Action and Freedom (Oxford Oxford University Press, 
zooo), pp. 203-zg. There I suggest that freedom of will is a “thick” evaluative concept. 
That is, no analysis of the concept in purely descriptive term will be satisfactory, but, 
instead, those to whom the concept applies must be thought of as exemplifying some- 
thing that is intrinsically evaluative: agency at its best. 
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drawing the distinction between strong and weak appetites and strong 
and weak rational motives, the visceral factor conception of motiva- 
tion does not help us to determine what to say about the addict’s 
responsibility. 
It is important to see the status of this critical point. What is being 
identified is not a point of incoherence in the claim that the com- 
pulsive-weak distinction is a normative one. Rather, the truth of the 
claim would suggest that the question of the degree to which addicts 
are or are not to be held responsible for their behavior cannot be an- 
swered simply by determining what is happening when the addict 
acts, and how the addict’s exercises of agency differ from those of the 
unaddicted. But if this isn’t the way to approach the question, what is? 
It is natural to look into the metaphysics of agency in order to find the 
bridge to normative concepts. We look, for instance, for a metaphysi- 
cal test for determining whether or not an agent could have done oth- 
erwise, thinking that we are thereby identifymg a necessary condition 
of moral responsibility. But if Watson is right, metaphysics alone are 
not sufficient for helping us to determine whether or not the addict 
acts compulsively or weakly, and so we must start where we originally 
thought we would end: with an answer to the normative question of 
the addict’s degree of responsibility. But how is it possible to start 
there? What does starting there amount to? 
In his most recent work, Watson has examined the legal notion of 
duress as a means of investigating the distinction between compulsion 
and weakness.6o Watson points out that in the law defendants are 
rarely able to successfully employ a duress defense if they found them- 
selves in the duress-producing circumstances as a result of voluntary 
conduct on their parts. A robber who injures a store owner when the 
owner pulls a gun during a robbery cannot defend himself on the 
grounds that the owner was threatening him with lethal force, and 
60. Gary Watson, “Ekcusing Addiction,” LP 18 (1999): 605ff. In developing his view 
there, Watson draws heavily on Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum, “Two Conceptions of 
Emotion in the Criminal Law,” Columbia Law Review 96 (1996): 269-374. Patricia Green- 
span, “Behavior Control and Freedom of Action” in Moral Responsibility. John Fischer 
ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. igi-zo4, argues that those who have mo- 
tivations like the addict are unfree because of duress. Kadri Vihvelin, “Stop Me Before I 
Kill Again,” pp. 120-24, argues that whether or not duress of this sort undermines free- 
dom, it does not undermine moral responsibility, 
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therefore he was under duress. This, despite the fact that an innocent 
bystander who injures the owner when the owner threatens him with 
the gun, mistaking him for one of the robbers, can launch a duress 
defense. These practices are usually justified on the grounds that the 
robber, and not the innocent bystander, got himself into the duress- 
producing circumstance voluntarily61 Since the link between voluntary 
drug-use and later addiction is just as strong as the link between vol- 
untarily entering into a robbery and finding oneself threatened with a 
gun, it follows that addicts face formidable obstacles in mounting a 
defense based on duress. Watson points out, however, that there are 
many conditions in which people find themselves that, like addiction, 
are entered into as a result of voluntary conduct and that do form the 
basis of a defense of duress. For instance, someone who lies to police 
to protect her child from arrest can use a duress defense against a 
charge of obstruction of justice. In cases of this nature, the “depen- 
dency” on the child might be no less voluntarily acquired than most 
drug dependencies. Watson argues that the difference between cases 
of this nature and most cases of addiction is that we often take depen- 
dencies on children (and parents, spouses, and the like) to be of great 
worth and importance, and so we excuse those who act from such 
dependencies and contrary to the letter of the law on the grounds that 
they were under duress. What this implies is that the legal concept of 
duress is normatively loaded. The law is recognizing that we cannot 
draw the distinction between those circumstances that do and do not 
produce duress without appeal to our evaluative assessments of the 
circumstances that are putatively duress-producing. 
The point can be extended to the distinction between weakness and 
compulsion. Whether behavior stemming from addiction is weak or 
compulsive is not merely a matter of the psychological and metaphysi- 
cal facts about the causal etiology of such behavior. Also relevant is our 
evaluative assessment of the dependency to the drug.62 If Watson is 
right about this, then he is taking one step towards providing a sub- 
61. Notice that the robber, in this example, didn’t literally choose to be threatened 
with a gun, and, conversely, the bystander very well may have voluntarily walked into 
the store at the wrong moment. So, what link between the duress-producing circum- 
stances and the agent’s voluntary conduct is needed to invalidate a duress defense is a 
complex matter. 
62. Watson, “Excusing Addiction,” p. 616; “Disordered Appetites,” p. 18. 
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stantive test for determining whether addicts are suffering under com- 
pulsion or are g d t y  of weakne~s.~3 Watson’s point helps to explain 
why, for instance, conduct motivated by appetites for things that we 
view as necessary for a flourishing life is often thought to be com- 
pelled, while similar conduct springing from other sorts of appetites is 
not. Why does dependency on air, for instance, provide the basis for a 
defense of duress-people have the right to do many things in order 
to prevent themselves from being suffocated that they wouldn’t ordi- 
narily have the right to do-while dependency on nicotine does not? 
Watson’s answer is that in the former case we think of the dependency 
as intertwined with a healthy life, while in the latter case we do not. 
Unfortunately, however, Watson’s point will only take us so far in un- 
derstanding the impact of addiction on responsibility. After all, there 
are a variety of different evaluative assessments of a dependency that 
we might make. The famous mathematician Paul Erdos took amphet- 
amines in huge doses and believed himself to be incapable of creative 
mathematics without their assistance. In fact, mathematical progress 
was the only thing that really mattered to Erdos and so, arguably any- 
way, his amphetamine dependency was intertwined with a flourishing 
life for him in much the way that a dependency on a spouse or a child 
is for the rest of  US.^^ But it is far from clear that Erdos’s responsibility 
for seemingly objectionable conduct would be any less than that 
rightly attributed to a person who acted in the same way in order to 
prevent amphetamine deprivation but for whom the dependency was 
not part of a flourishing life. So, while Watson is certainly right that an 
evaluative assessment of dependency is one of the factors involved in 
drawing the compulsion-weakness distinction, it is far from clear what 
role such assessments play. 
Nonetheless, Watson’s work points the way towards a promising av- 
enue for further work on addiction: we can certainly go farther in 
63. R. Jay Wallace, “Addiction as Defect of Will,” pp. 627-28, suggests that this sense 
in which the concept of compulsion is sensitive to normative assessments is of little 
significance. Wallace is certainly right that evaluative judgments of the sort that Watson 
appeals to are not sufficient for distinguishing compulsions from mere weaknesses. 
However, at issue for Watson at least, although not for Wallace, is not sufficiency, but 
necessity. 
64. The definitive biography of Erdos is Paul Hoffman, The Man Who Loved Only 
Numbers (New York Hyperion, 1998). 
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identifying the range of normative assessments that enter into a judg- 
ment of the applicability of the concepts of compulsion and weakness, 
and the role that such assessments play in applying those concepts. 
Such work will help us to go farther in determining the degree to 
which addicts manifest one of these faults as opposed to the other. 
However, such work will not put us in position to supply a simple 
answer to the question of the degree, if any, to which the responsibility 
of an addict is diminished; we won’t find ourselves with a decision 
procedure for answering that question. What such work will provide is 
a more accurate picture of the way in which our assessments of the 
responsibility of addicts are linked to other normative evaluations of 
agents and the circumstances under which they labor. It is possible 
that the best picture of the addict’s responsibility is more like an Im- 
pressionist painting than a blueprint. 
Iv. CONCLUSION 
Recent contributions to the philosophical literature on addiction can 
be classified by the degree to which they depart from the model of 
human motivation provided by traditional rational choice theory. At 
one extreme is work being done by theorists who do not depart at all 
from that model. Such work does not provide a satisfactory account of 
the impact of addiction on responsibility, since it can only be used to 
provide such an account by making questionable assumptions about 
what agent-rationality amounts to. Still, the application of rational 
choice theory to the case of addiction serves as a fascinating guide to 
the traps in which a rational agent can find herself. Sometimes our 
rationality can be our affliction; in exercising it, we can end up worse 
off than we would have been had we acted irrationally. Of course, 
rationality cannot provide the ladder for climbing out of this con- 
dition since we cannot, by definition, have decisive reason to act 
irrationally.65 
Departures from the traditional rational choice model, in moving 
away from the hydraulic conception of the causal force of preferences, 
come up against deep questions about the nature of rational motiva- 
65. This kind of line of thought is explored in an interesting and entertaining way in 
Thomas Schelliig, “Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality” in GH, pp. 265-84. 
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tion and how it differs from other forms. While Ainslie would not agree 
with this point, his work indicates precisely how much of a departure 
is really necessary in order to account for the kind of struggle that 
addiction involves. Insofar as exercises of will serve as a corrective to 
the irrationality of preferences over time that Ainslie identifies, it must 
be that the will serves as a source of motivation differing intrinsically 
from the preference-based motivation that both Ainslie and the ratio- 
nal choice theorists take to be the only sort. 
How much more of a departure from the rational choice model the 
recognition of this point really requires remains, to some degree, an 
open question. Elster, Loewenstein, and prominent thinkers in the free 
will literature, such as Fischer and Ravizza, aim to provide normatively 
neutral tests for determining the difference between rationally en- 
twined forms of motivation and the sort to which addicts, arguably, are 
subject. These efforts may succeed. But they may not, or even if they 
do, they may end up converging on the normatively loaded concep- 
tion of addictive motivation to which Watson is drawn. In this area, 
anyway, important and foundational conceptual work remains to be 
done. 
